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This paper positions itself among the very rare microeconomic analyses on the 
consequences of civil war. Up to now, most analyses on this topic are based upon 
household surveys. The originality of the present study is that it investigates for the first 
time the likely predominant route by which civil conflict affects the economy, namely 
through firms. The context of the study is Sierra Leone, a country that was ravaged by a 
violent conflict from 1991 to 2002. The approach is to use geographical variations in the 
intensity of conflict to estimate the impact of violence on firms, on which we have data 
from the World Bank 2007 Employers Survey. The proposed theory is that during the 
conflict, violence affects production through a form of technical regress and demand 
through a reduction in income. The persistent post-conflict effects are yet less obvious…/ 
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We assume that war forces a prolonged contraction in output skills, which slows the 
pace of recovery. We termed this phenomenon ‘forgetting by not doing’. The results 
confirm our theory. Civil war negatively impacts the existence of firms and 
employment, but there is no distinction between regions. However, the size of firms in 
2006 is negatively affected by the intensity of the war in the area it operates. Yet, firms 
tend to grow twice faster in more affected areas, strikingly matching the 
macroeconomic rate of recovery post-conflict environments (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004). The analysis of training patterns clearly confirms the long lasting lack of skills 
experienced as a result of the war in areas where the conflict was more intense. 
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 1 Introduction
Civil war is a diﬃcult context for applied economic research. To date, the economic consequences of
civil war and its aftermath have been investigated predominantly at the macroeconomic level, using
national accounts data to estimate the impact on GDP (Barro, 1991; Collier, 1999; Collier and Hoef-
ﬂer, 2004). The relatively rare microeconomic analyses have been based upon household survey data,
focusing upon the vulnerability to violence (Deininger, 2003) and the eﬀect of being a victim of violence
upon subsequent political participation (Bellows and Miguel, 2007). Yet, the predominant route by
which civil war aﬀects the economy is likely to be through ﬁrms. To our knowledge, the present study
is the ﬁrst to use ﬁrm level data to investigate the eﬀects of civil war and post-conﬂict recovery. The
added value of such an analysis lies in the microeconomic evidence. We fully acknowledge that the
poor quality of the dataset calls for further investigation to allow robust conclusions.
The context of the research is Sierra Leone. Between 1991 and 2002 Sierra Leone was ravaged by an
extremely violent civil war. The war led to over 50,000 deaths, the displacement of 500,000 civilians,
and a wholesale destruction of the national economy. By the end of the war, Sierra Leone had sunk
to the bottom of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index
(HDI). In 2002, peace was achieved by the intervention of British troops: the insurgent Revolutionary
United Front rapidly collapsed. Since then security has been maintained without signiﬁcant challenge,
aided by a continued British military presence. Yet, the pace of recovery has been modest: in 2008,
the most recent year for which data is available, the country remained at the bottom of the HDI.
While the conﬂict in Sierra Leone was intense and prolonged, it was concentrated in particular loca-
tions. Household data analysed by Bellows and Miguel (2007) provides a reasonable measure of this
spatial variation. Our approach is to use this variation to estimate the impact of violence on the growth
of ﬁrms, on which we have data from a ﬁrm survey. Clearly, even ﬁrms in areas not directly aﬀected
by violence were nevertheless operating in a country at civil war and this is likely to have aﬀected their
performance. During war time government policies will deteriorate, trade with conﬂict-aﬀected areas
will be reduced, and ﬁrms may fear that violence will spread to their own area. Hence, our approach
is likely to underestimate the full eﬀects of civil war and so should be thought of as a lower bound.
How might exposure to the violence of civil war aﬀect ﬁrms? In Section 2 we propose a simple
theory. The eﬀects during war are straightforward: violence aﬀects production through a form of
technical regress and demand through a reduction in income. However, the persistent post-conﬂict
eﬀects are less obvious: we propose a phenomenon that we term ‘forgetting by not doing’. In essence,
war forces a prolonged contraction in output, skills atrophy through neglect and this slows the pace of
recovery. In Section 3 we describe the context of the war in Sierra Leone, and in Section 4 our data.
Section 5 presents our results.
22 The Eﬀect of civil war on ﬁrm performance
The most striking visual images of violence are those of physical destruction. These eﬀects are po-
tentially persistent even after the conﬂict has ended. However, in low income countries they may
be relatively minor: there is little capital at risk and after the conﬂict replacements can swiftly be
imported. Miguel and Roland (2006) study the eﬀects of the bombing of Vietnam, probably the most
destructive civil war in any developing country and clearly far more destructive than that in Sierra
Leone. They ﬁnd that the bombing left no discernable long term economic eﬀects. Cerra and Saxena
(2008) observe that output partially rebounds after a civil war, in contrast to ﬁnancial crises. Using a
panel data they found that half the loss is recuperated after four years, while the other half of cumu-
lative loss remains after a decade. They explain this characteristic rebound by the fact that rebuilt
infrastructures can be repaired within a short time. However, they do not formulate any hypothesis
about the causes of the persistent loss. Rather than physical destruction, the most important eﬀects
of civil war violence on ﬁrms are likely to have been the disruption of production through the ﬂight
of employees, the unreliability of transport, and the fear of looting. Faced with unreliable transport,
ﬁrms would normally have carried larger inventories, but the fear of looting would warrant the oppo-
site response. Such costs of disruption can be characterized as technical regress in the formal, private
sector of the economy and so raise the unit cost of its output.
Firms are also aﬀected by a decline in demand. This is driven by the decline in incomes, and more
particularly cash incomes, as people move liquid assets abroad for safety and shift into subsistence ac-
tivities. The demand for the output of the formal private sector is thus reduced through a combination
of the higher unit cost of its output and the reduced cash income of the wider economy.
These eﬀects in themselves appear to be readily reversible, so that post-conﬂict recovery should
be rapid. With a secure peace productivity, the demand would be restored. Why might the cost of
conﬂict be more persistent? We propose that in low income countries such as Sierra Leone the key
channel for persistence is not physical, but human capital, and that the key route by which human
capital is lost is through the atrophy of skills.
Skills are maintained through use. The theory of ‘learning by doing’ (Arrow, 1962) proposed that
‘doing’ was the main mechanism for learning, but more evidently it is essential to the retention of
task-speciﬁc knowledge. The technical regress induced by civil war reduces the maintenance of skills
through two eﬀects. Directly, technical regress amounts to the reversion to production practices, which
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to manual operations. In eﬀect, they learn reversionary techniques which peace will make redundant,
and forget techniques which peace will again make feasible and superior. Indirectly, technical regress
reduces the maintenance of skills through its aggregate eﬀect on income and hence on demand. In-
directly, the contraction of output in response to the decline in demand leads to a contraction in
the labour force, though less than proportionately due to the productivity decline. The decline in
employment then deskills that part of the labour force that loses employment in the activity, in a
process analogous to the deskilling of workers who remain unemployed for long periods, although this
literature has essentially been studied in developed economies. Pissarides (1992) uses a stylized model
to emphasize that the loss of skills associated with unemployment persistence can have long lasting
consequences and may explain the observed slow adjustment of the labour market after a temporary
shock on employment. This easily relates to our theory that the most persistent consequence of war
is the destruction of human capital. The ‘eﬀect of the business cycle’ (Dynarski and Sheﬀrin, 1990;
Baker, 1992) translates into an increase of unemployment length during economic recession. Indeed,
the outﬂow rate for long term unemployment collapses during recession as employers have larger pools
of labour to choose from. Of course, in developed countries, wages would adjust and unions would play
a major role. In Europe, Machin and Manning (1999) conclude that higher rates of long term unem-
ployment put an upwards pressure on wages that tend to be higher in periods of large unemployment.
Although the phenomenon is similar to the deskilling of unemployed workers, the recovery mechanisms
are likely to be diﬀerent in the case of post-conﬂict as most workers are employed in the informal sector.
The atrophy of skills through reversionary technology and reduced employment is only of conse-
quence once peace is restored. Having adjusted to the conditions of conﬂict, with the onset of peace
ﬁrms ﬁnd themselves in a favourable disequilibrium. Demand increases and there is now scope to
abandon the reversionary technologies. In response to the disequilibrium ﬁrms expand, but in doing
so they encounter a shortage of skilled labour. Firms in conﬂict-aﬀected areas must therefore make do
with lower quality workers and hence have lower productivity.
This simple theory of the eﬀect of conﬂict and its legacy on ﬁrms has testable implications. The
most evident is that during conﬂict those ﬁrms in areas most aﬀected by conﬂict would contract rel-
ative to those in less aﬀected areas. Similarly, in post-conﬂict, we would expect this pattern to be
reversed. A less evident testable implication is that, in the post-conﬂict phase, there would be an
apparent paradox: the fastest growing ﬁrms would be less productive. Finally, in the post-conﬂict
phase, those ﬁrms in conﬂict-aﬀected areas would manifest the most severe shortage of skilled labour.
Taking a Cobb-Douglas production function where Y the production level at date t depends on the
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with B > 0 ; φ > 0 and Kt = sYt where s is the saving rate.
This, however, does not enable us to capture the impact on the stock of knowledge A of a decrease in
production from the previous periods which leads to the resurrection of reversionary technologies, and
so a loss of skill in cutting-edge technologies. One way to model such an eﬀect would be to introduce
the concept of previous peak output, and allow A to decline in responses to shortfalls of current output
from previous peak output. Thus, to capture this eﬀect of forgetting by not doing we rewrite (1):
At = BK
φ
t + C 4 Ytδ4Yt<0 (2)
where δ4Y t = 1 if 4Yt < 0 and 0 otherwise and C < 0. In other words when 4Yt > 0, we observe
the standard ‘learning by doing’ eﬀect, but when 4Yt < 0, which is characteristic of conﬂict environ-
ment, the ‘learning by doing’ eﬀect is replaced by a ‘forgetting by not doing’ eﬀect. As production
shrinks during the war when activity reverts to subsistence, the level of knowledge of the economy A,
decreases from its previous level.
This paper is an attempt to test the veracity of our ‘forgetting by not doing’ theory using country
level data on Sierra Leone. Without a doubt, the main contribution to the existing literature therefore
stands at the micro level. The idea is to investigate whether ﬁrms in zones highly aﬀected by the
war behave diﬀerently ﬁve years after the end of the conﬂict. In particular, do those ﬁrms face higher
shortages in human capital and as a result a higher demand for skills? This would conﬁrm that ﬁrms in
conﬂict-aﬀected areas have to make do with lower quality workers and consequently, that the persistent
eﬀect of war on ﬁrms is through human capital. In order for us to fully validate our theory, we need to
make sure that our analysis does not capture a completely diﬀerent story. Indeed, a higher demand for
human capital could serve as a substitute for physical investment. Machines, for example, might be too
expensive to import and, as a consequence, employers would invest into human capital to compensate
the lack of machines. Even workers who previously worked on machines might need to be trained
to work manually. If this constitutes reality there is a danger in interpreting investment in human
capital as validating the ‘forgetting by not doing’ while in fact the eﬀects of war are on physical capital.
To avoid misinterpretation we need to discuss the physical capital-labour complementarity versus
substitutability. However, as is always the case in analyses focusing on post-conﬂict environments, we
face problems with the quality of the data. One of the main limitations is that we have very little
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intensity by sectors prior to the war. We also cannot estimate a production function with precision
as we do not have data on wages or costs of capital. One solution would be to compare Sierra Leone
with countries with similar characteristics, by sector, for example Ghana. This looks like an attrac-
tive option, however, we could not ﬁnd any research investigating the capital-labour complementarity
in comparable countries. The research on Ghana mainly focuses on the manufacturing sector. Teal
(2000), while investigating the fall in real wages in the 1990s, ﬁnds that the elasticity of substitution
between unskilled labour and capital is higher than between skilled labour and capital. Duﬀy et al.
(2004) use a cross section panel of 73 developed and developing countries over 25 years to investigate
the labour-skill complementarity. Using a lower than usual threshold for skilled capital - some primary
school, completed primary school, some secondary - they ﬁnd some evidence of capital-skills comple-
mentarity. This conﬁrms the mild evidence found by Fallon and Layard (1975) using a cross-country
data for the year 1963. Most of the existing country level literature on the subject is based on de-
veloped countries data, from which we cannot draw any sensible conclusion for a lowest income country.
As a result, we cannot realistically conclude whether physical and human capital are substitutes
or complements in Sierra Leone, although it seems that labour-skill complementarity might be more
likely. Empirically, if physical investment translates into a lower need for staﬀ training, it is likely
that physical and human capital are substitutes, if it translates into a higher need to train staﬀ, then
complementarity can be assumed. If physical and human capital are complementary, then our analysis
would constitute a lower bound. Indeed, in areas where the conﬂict was more intense, violence would
have destroyed more physical capital which as a result would decrease the need for training.
3 The shadow of the civil war
Like most of sub-Saharan Africa, Sierra Leone is noticeable for its very young population. Most of its
youth, especially those from rural areas grew up during the decade long Dirty War (Gberie, 2005). As
a result, both their human capital and transition to adulthood have been dramatically aﬀected adding
the diﬃculties of being an ex-combatant or a victim, the burden of forced migration and psychological
long lasting traumas to widespread poverty. Many children at the time of the conﬂict were prevented
from going to school.1 Consequently, the literacy rate in Sierra Leone is particularly low.2 Thirty-ﬁve
per cent of the 15-24 year old and 63 per cent of the 25 to 35 year old never attended school (World
Bank, 2007). Both age groups constitute the core of today’s work force as life expectancy hardly
reaches 41 years. Promoting employment opportunities for youth has thus been identiﬁed as a core
challenge in the Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Paper and is widely recognized as a necessity for the
1The conﬂict in Sierra Leone was characterized by the use of child soldiers in the diﬀerent ﬁghting armed factions.
239.3 per cent as opposed to 59 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa for 15 years old and above (World Bank, 2007).
6political stability as a result of the predominant role played by youth during the civil war.3
GDP per capita dramatically fell during the 1980s, eventually leading to the war and ten years of
gradual destruction of the whole economy (Figure 1). Between 1980 and 2000, the GDP per capita was
halved, from a mere $300 to $150. Since 2000, the economy has been kicking oﬀ again. Yet, despite a
successful period of recovery from the conﬂict characterized by a growth rate of GDP per capita close
to 4 per cent, the government of Sierra Leone is still facing colossal challenges to promote sustainable
development. In 2008, the small West African state still lay at the bottom line of the UNDP’s HDI.
In 2006, 70 per cent of the population still lived under the national poverty line. Recovery from two
decades of war and negative growth is yet to be achieved and Sierra Leone suﬀers from an overall lack
of economic opportunities.4
Figure 1: Long term trends of GDP and growth in Sierra Leone, 1980-2007
Source: WDI 2008.
Figure 2 shows a striking return to an agricultural economy and a switch towards subsistence
activities in the early 1980s when the Sierra Leonean economy started to collapse and the country fell
into war. At the end of the conﬂict, the size of the service sector was reduced to a quarter of what
it was in 1980. The relative sizes of sectors are gradually returning to their counterfactual: by 2007,
the value added of the agricultural sector as a percentage of GDP follows a decreasing path up to just
over 40 per cent and the service sector size reaches 30 per cent, double of what it was in 2000 but still
half of its relative size in 1980. The ﬁrst ﬁve years of post-conﬂict are characterized by a slow return
to a state of the economy similar to the one prior to the 1980s.
On the business environment side the situation is similar. Investment is still shy as underlined by the
3The government’s oﬃcial deﬁnition of youth is individuals between the ages of 15 to 35 as opposed to the standard
deﬁnition of 15 to 24. This has been decided to take into account the lost 10 years of conﬂict at the individual level.
4The ﬁgures are available at www.worldbank.org/sle.
7Figure 2: Long term trends of the relative shares of sectors, 1964-2007
Source: WDI 2008.
rather small number of large ﬁrms operating in the country. Moreover, existing businesses face massive
constraints on growth and expansion such as access to ﬁnance, due to a completely underdeveloped
formal credit system, poor access to electricity,5 and an apparent lack of resources (World Bank, 2007).
The 2007 World Bank study also reports that availability of labour does not constitute a constraint
in itself for ﬁrms but the availability of skilled workers remains a major problem for the largest ones.
The rating of the Doing Business Initiative, which provides a national quantitative measure of diﬀerent
business regulations, conﬁrms that Sierra Leone lies among the countries where it is the hardest to
do business. In 2006, when the survey was undertaken, the report emphasized the diﬃculty of hiring
and ﬁring workers as well as of getting credit. In the 2009 Doing Business report that covers the
period from April 2007 to June 2008, Sierra Leone ranks 156th out of 181 countries. Figure 3 shows
the evolution of the ranking over the period covered by the initiative. If it seemed relatively easier to
start a business in 2007/2008 than in the previous year (53rd rank/+41), Sierra Leonean employers
face among the worst conditions in dealing with construction permits, but also in employing workers,
registering property, getting credit, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and in
closing a business. In more details, the study reports a duration of 283 days to build a warehouse.
Firing costs amount to 189 weeks of salary as opposed to an average of 68.3 weeks in the region. On
the credit side, the scope, access, and quality of credit information available through public registries
or private bureaus is close to nil. The costs of enforcing contracts in percentage of claims are three
times higher than in the region. Overall, this diﬃcult operating environment explains in part the slow
growing path of the private sector.
5National electricity is, as of 2007, almost inexistent and ﬁrms and households rely on private generators running
with fuel at a very high cost.
8Figure 3: Sierra Leone, ease of doing business ranks
Source: Doing Business 2009.
In the context of this paper, it is necessary to highlight some of the particular features of the war.
The war erupted in 1991 at the border with neighbouring Liberia and later on spread out over the
entire country, reaching Freetown on Jan 6 1999. The war techniques included, among others, the
systematic targeting of civilians as a terror tactic, rapes, cutting of limbs, abduction of child soldiers
as well as the intensive looting of diamond resources located essentially in the areas bordering Liberia.
The decade of ﬁghting was rythmed by advancements of the rebels towards Freetown and defeats
against the government army, and later on by ECOWAS peacekeepers pushing them back towards
their stronghold in the East. The ﬁghting was not dictated by the destruction of particular economic
sectors, apart from mining. In other words, the variation in conﬂict intensity was not systematically
related to the structure of the economy. On the contrary, the primary incentive was to control Freetown
and as the rebel forces advanced towards their objective whatever was on the way - villages, villagers,
towns - was destroyed. The war tactics were characterized by extensive looting of anything with any
value such as during Operation Pay Yourself and by widespread killings of civilians as an eﬀective
terror tactic such as Operation Burn House. The deadliest illustration of the later was with no doubt
Operation No Living Thing, the name speaks for itself.
4 Data
The Sierra Leone Employers Survey (SLES) undertaken by the World Bank in 20066 constitutes the
core of our database. The survey covers four districts out of eleven in total: the Western urban area,
which includes the capital city Freetown, the Western rural area surrounding Freetown, Bo district
in the South, Bombali district in the North, and Kailahun district, the Revolutionary United Front’s
stronghold, in the East at the border with Liberia (see Figures 4 and 5). The data coverage well
reﬂects the diﬀerences observed in Sierra Leone in terms of economic development as well as how the
6‘Improving opportunities for sustainable youth employment in Sierra Leone’ (World Bank, 2007).
9country has been aﬀected by the civil war in the 1990s. For our study, which focuses on ﬁrms, we only
relied on the urban area data that surveyed 419 formal and 248 informal businesses.7 All 30 large and
136 medium-sized ﬁrms were surveyed along with 502 small businesses.8
It is important to acknowledge a possible selection bias. Indeed, only survivor ﬁrms were surveyed
and it is impossible to methodologically assess the reasons why those ﬁrms survived and others did not.
This potential bias might aﬀect the results and data is insuﬃcient to enable correction. However, a
few studies have investigated the survival of ﬁrms in Africa, and especially in Ghana, a country similar
to Sierra Leone in many ways (geography, language, colonial history) with the exception that it never
experienced civil war (S¨ oderbom et al., 2005; Frazer, 2005; S¨ oderbom and Teal, 2006). Both investiga-
tions conclude for a signiﬁcant relationship between productivity and probability of exit. Nevertheless,
while they also both ﬁnd a size eﬀect - that smaller ﬁrms have a higher probability of disappearing
- Harding et al.’s (2006) results using data on Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania suggest that ‘creative
destruction’ occurs among large ﬁrms but not small ﬁrms. Is it likely that the same happened in
Sierra Leone during the war? Probably. But the rate of destruction was certainly much higher, es-
pecially in war zones. So if survival rate followed the same path in Sierra Leone, small ﬁrms would
have been destroyed together with less productive large ﬁrms. In fact, the productive large ﬁrms
might have closed down to reopen after the war. As a result, the number of small ﬁrms is potentially
lower in highly intense conﬂict areas. Large ﬁrms might be on average more productive than what
they would have been and ﬁnally, a large proportion of small ﬁrms might have disappeared. The lat-
ter point may well have been oﬀset at the end of the war with small business creation. The potential
impact of the selection bias on each dependent variable at the ﬁrm level will be discussed in due course.
We use the number of ﬁrms per chiefdom to control for the state of the economy before the war.
Such information is provided by the ‘Directory of business and industry for the Western area and mul-
tiunit ﬁrms’ (Sierra Leone Central Statistics Oﬃce, 1970) and the ‘Directory of business and industry
for the Northern, Southern and Eastern provinces’ (Sierra Leone Central Statistics Oﬃce, 1968). These
are, to our knowledge, the only existing documents that give some relevant economic information dis-
aggregated at the chiefdom level before the war. A brief description of the activities of the ﬁrms allows
classifying the ﬁrms by sector matching the SLES classiﬁcation. Nevertheless, we need to acknowledge
that the number of ﬁrms obtained as such raises some problems. First, for the Freetown area, there
is no possible way to ascertain in which of the eight chiefdoms the ﬁrms where located. This forces
us to treat the entire Western urban area as one single location instead of eight distinct chiefdoms.
7Businesses can be registered with: Administrator and Registrar Generals Oﬃce, National Social Security and Insur-
ance Fund (NASSIT), National Revenue Authority (NRA), Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Labor, Licensing Authority,
or other authority (such as Local Council and Pharmacy Board).
8Large businesses are deﬁned as employing 50 workers or more, medium-sized businesses have 10 to 49 employees,
and small businesses have less than 10 employees.
10Second, we only obtain a picture of the economy in the early 1970s leaving a 20-year gap until the
beginning of the war in 1991. However, the civil war broke out after decades of mismanagement and
corruption since independence from Britain in 1967. The following decades since independence appear
as premises of the coming war. Thus, 1970 gives a good snapshot of the economy before the process
of collapse that culminated in the war.
The intensity of war, our variable of interest for this analysis, is calculated following Bellows and
Miguel (2006). We compile the average answer by chiefdom to four questions asked to households:
- Were any members of your household killed during the war?
- Were any members of your household injured/maimed during the war?
- Did anyone from this community/neighbourhood die as the result of the conﬂict?
- Were any members of this community/neighbourhood injured/maimed as a result of the conﬂict?9
We are then left with four variables by chiefdoms ranging from 0 to 1.10 We deﬁne the intensity of
conﬂict as the mean of these four variables. It is important to mention that almost 80 per cent of
the households surveyed moved to their community before 2002, we thus expect that our intensity
variable represents the reality and is not based on population movements. Bellows and Miguel (2006)
used information on whether any members of the responding household were made refugees during the
war instead of the information focusing on the wider community level. We use their slightly diﬀerent
measure of conﬂict intensity to check the robustness of our results.
A problem of endogeneity may arise from the fact that higher intensity areas might have had
intrinsic characteristics making them more likely to be aﬀected by hostilities. This could lead to
biased estimators in our regressions. To avoid such a possibility we instrument the intensity of conﬂict
using the distance to Monrovia from the epicentre of the chiefdom in kilometres. The assumption is
that the closer to Liberia, the more intense the conﬂict in the chiefdom.11 On the contrary, distance to
Monrovia should not impact the dependent variables. Chiefdoms and ﬁrms closer to Monrovia should
not be systematically diﬀerent from chiefdoms and ﬁrms located further from Monrovia. Chiefdoms
close to Monrovia could indeed be systematically diﬀerent if, for example, roads from Sierra Leone to
Liberia were important trade routes. In fact, roads between the two countries are in bad condition and
9These variables are obtained using the 2005 National Public Services dataset (IRCBP, GoBifo) collected in 2005.
The data covers the entire country. 6341 households, clustered by census enumeration area, have been surveyed.
10Refer to the maps in the appendix to visualize the diﬀerences in the intensity of conﬂict at the district and chiefdom
level.
11As a matter of fact, it is now widely believed that the civil war in Sierra Leone was, to a great extent, orchestrated
by the neighbouring Liberia. Indeed, subsequent parts of the rebel factions operating at the start of the war in 1991
appeared to have been constituted of Liberian citizens. Furthermore diamonds mined in Sierra Leone were smuggled
by the rebels through the border (Smillie et al., 2000) probably in exchange for arms and ammunitions. None of these
facts however have been proved so far and former President Charles Taylor’s ongoing trial at the Special Court for Sierra
Leone should answer some questions regarding the RUF’s Liberian linkages. Charles Taylor’s trial began in 2006. He
is tried for his implication in the war in Sierra Leone and charged with 11 counts of Crimes against humanity and War
crimes).





Figure 5: Conﬂict intensity by chiefdom in four districts surveyed
The darker the colour the higher the
intensity of conflict in the chiefdoms.
The transparency level of the colour is
set to correspond to the intensity of the
war
Source: IRCBP (2005).
12require the use of high clearance vehicles. It takes approximately eight hours to travel from Kenema,
the largest town close to the border on Sierra Leone’s side, to the border gate at Bo-Waterside. The last
50 kilometres are gravel roads. The heavy precipitation around the border further increases travelling
diﬃculties in the area, especially during the rainy season (May to December). In addition, the main
border bridge to cross the Mano River was closed from 1990 due to war in both countries. It only
reopened in June 2007, after the data was collected. Distance to Monrovia, as a tradable route, is
therefore unlikely to have played a role in the recovery of the surveyed ﬁrms. Statistically, distance to
Monrovia is not signiﬁcant when introduced in most of the core OLS regressions. First stage regressions
conﬁrm that the distance to Monrovia is a strong predictor of the intensity of conﬂict. It is highly
statistically signiﬁcant at a one per cent threshold in all regressions.
5 Results
We ﬁrst investigate the legacy of the conﬂict at the chiefdom level. We then dig further in analysing the
impact on the ﬁrms themselves to verify our hypothesis that civil war durably aﬀects human capital.
5.1 At the chiefdom level: the eﬀect of the war on the existence of ﬁrms
and employment
We start the analysis by focusing on the information available at the chiefdom level. Firstly we
investigate whether the intensity of the conﬂict had a signiﬁcant impact on the number of ﬁrms now









where i refers to the chiefdom and j to the sector. X is a set of control characteristics at the
chiefdom level that includes the number of ﬁrms by sector and chiefdom in 1970. Sectorj is a discrete
variable taking the value of 1 for the sector j. Intensityi is the conﬂict intensity level of chiefdom i.
The interacted terms intensityi x sectorj capture a potential sectorial legacy of war.
Interestingly, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between the number of ﬁrms in 2006 and the intensity
of war at the chiefdom level. In addition, the interacted term between intensity of conﬂict and the
number of ﬁrms per sector in the chiefdom is only signiﬁcant at 10 percent with instrumentation,
suggesting that the economy was aﬀected as a whole, uniformily.12 The district-ﬁxed eﬀects enable
comparison inside a smaller geographical identity where it is thought that other external factors that
could aﬀect our dependent variables, such as climate, are rather similar. None of the sector dummies
12Note that certain sectors were inexistent in 1970, preventing us to investigate the ratio of the number of ﬁrms in
2006 over the number of ﬁrms in 1970.
13or any of the interacted terms between the intensity variable and the sector dummies are signiﬁcant.
Overall the results suggest that the intensity of war did not aﬀect the current (2006) existence of ﬁrms.
Either conﬂict led to a uniform destruction of the economy of the whole country, or ﬁrms were rapidly
reestablished following the end of the conﬂict. There is no identiﬁable sector eﬀect of the war. The
results are presented in Table 1.
14Table 1: Number of ﬁrms by sector and by chiefdom in 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
Intensity 0.056 5.826 12.258 (.)
(3.265) (5.201) (8.906)
No. of ﬁrms per chiefdom/sector in 1970 0.296 -0.641 0.291 1.548
(0.170) (0.234)∗ (0.129) (0.474)∗∗
No. of ﬁrms per chiefdom/sector 1970 x intensity -0.514 2.023 -0.448 -3.586
(0.443) (0.639)∗ (0.336) (1.194)∗
Agroactivities -2.771 -1.141 -2.823 16.835
(2.276) (2.517) (2.337) (9.255)
Agroactivities x intensity 1.711 -2.471 1.727 8.468
(4.063) (5.533) (4.143) (23.024)
Manufacturing 0.393 -1.626 0.295 19.113
(3.101) (3.956) (3.224) (8.530)
Manufacturing x intensity -1.565 2.475 -1.487 6.248
(3.790) (6.854) (3.917) (25.779)
Construction -2.995 -0.665 -3.027 17.852
(3.047) (3.520) (3.106) (10.134)
Construction x intensity 1.446 -4.106 1.473 5.718
(5.259) (8.007) (5.353) (22.476)
Services 9.024 13.622 8.454 23.529
(7.801) (9.103) (7.396) (6.723)∗∗
Services x intensity -10.203 -24.239 -9.669 0.298
(11.913) (16.070) (11.291) (28.830)
Sales 2.017 15.647 -1.698 0.000
(2.389) (5.637)∗ (3.974) (.)
Sales x intensity 1.746 -39.777 5.038 57.060
(4.634) (16.748)
∗ (4.141) (41.759)
Health and education (.) (.) (.) 23.769
(9.649)∗













District eﬀects x x
adj. R
2 0.84 0.88 0.76 0.91
N 114 114 114 114
Notes: * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%. Agroactivities refer to main activity reported as ﬁshing,
forestry, poultry, livestock, and agrobusiness; manufacturing corresponds to manufacturing activities, mining
and quarrying as well as electricity, gas and water; sale corresponds to retail and wholesale activities; services
refer to main activity reported as repairs, hotels and restaurants, transport, communication, real estate,
public administration, ﬁnancial estate, and others including legal activities, etc.; the health and education
sector deﬁnition regroups pharmacy, education, health, and social work activities.
15Second, we look at whether the conﬂict aﬀected the current (2006) level of employment by sector13
and estimate the following equation, similar to equation (3):






δj(intensityi ∗ sectorj) + εi,j (4)
where, i designates the chiefdom and j the sector. X is a set of controls for chiefdom i and sectorj
is a discrete variable equal to 1 for the sector j. The interacted terms capture a potential diﬀerent
eﬀect of the war on employment level depending on the sector considered. We can indeed envisage
that some sectors of activities were more aﬀected by the war then others.
The results are reported in Table 2. The conclusion is alike. The intensity of the war does not sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect current (2006) employment at the chiefdom level. Again, either Sierra Leone’s labour
market was aﬀected as a whole with no apparent diﬀerence between areas where the conﬂict was more
or less intense, or employment rapidly recovered.
13The proxy of the total employment is deﬁned as the sum of number of employees reported in the ﬁrms surveyed by
sector and by chiefdom.
16Table 2: Employment by sector per chiefdom
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
Intensity of conﬂict 10.869 112.936 364.561
(43.883) (90.503) (373.565)










Agroactivities -67.346 -51.163 61.564 72.336
(47.491) (53.371) (64.041) (77.570)
Agroactivities x intensity 62.856 26.812 -67.296 -976.920
(81.764) (114.657) (87.595) (1258.303)
Manufacturing 45.957 -.253 173.191 244.376
(45.900) (48.155) (135.831) (196.768)
Manufacturing x intensity -59.422 45.912 -187.323 -1233.936
(72.545) (132.838) (224.992) (1462.912)
Construction -32.407 2.878 97.329 140.263
(23.774) (23.969) (102.683) (148.826)
Construction x intensity 23.818 -55.505 -106.660 -1089.072
(43.475) (77.595) (139.507) (1378.600)
Services 244.171 345.547 355.834 578.856
(275.170) (357.745) (372.528) (607.542)
Services x intensity -185.287 -414.463 -297.618 -1689.481
(397.845) (604.016) (543.389) (2124.896)
Sales
Sale x intensity -894.936
(1184.210)
Health and education -68.597 -70.929 62.251 70.750
(48.615) (54.862) (61.916) (73.915)
Health and education x intensity 82.646 88.567 -48.884 -953.175
(78.224) (108.171) (90.194) (1254.688)
Cons -.835 -46.316 -32.239 383.069
(38.020) (45.698) (200.271) (322.913)
First stage





District eﬀetcs x x
Obs 114 114 114 114
R2 0.498 0.5 0.175 0.202
Notes: see notes Table 1.
175.2 At the ﬁrm level: eﬀects on size, income, and needs of the ﬁrms
To investigate deeper the impact of the conﬂict we now use the ﬁrm level dataset.14 We ﬁrst look




where k refers to the ﬁrm k, i to the chiefdom i, Xi are characteristics of the chiefdom i and Xk
of the ﬁrm k. conflicthistoryk is a set of variables capturing the history of the ﬁrm k relative to the
conﬂict and value of 1 for the sector j. Intensityi is the conﬂict intensity level of chiefdom i.
We now ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of the intensity of conﬂict. As is common, we ﬁnd that the older
the ﬁrm, the larger the number of employees. From the age of the ﬁrm we enter the number of years
during which the ﬁrm was exposed to the conﬂict. Interacting this with the intensity of conﬂict in the
area in which the ﬁrm operates, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant and negative with an absolute value about
twice that of the direct eﬀect of the number of years during the conﬂict that the ﬁrm was operating.
Thus, ﬁrms operating in chiefdoms that had more intense ﬁghting are now (2006) signiﬁcantly smaller
than other ﬁrms ceteris paribus. A possible explanation could be that they faced a shortage of labour
during the conﬂict as workers moved into the armed forces or were displaced. This leads to a drop
in terms of inputs available in a labour-intensive economy as well as a fall in demand. Note that the
selection bias implies that survivor ﬁrms should be bigger where the conﬂict was more intense, thus
potentially leading to an underestimation of the coeﬃcient of the interactive term.
Whereas employment evidently declined as a result of the intensity of violence during the conﬂict,
it then recovered correspondingly faster post-conﬂict. The coeﬃcient on the number of years since the
conﬂict, interacted with the intensity level of the war, is positive and signiﬁcant. Recalling that the
intensity measure varies on a 0 to 1 scale, the more intense the conﬂict was, the faster the economy
recovered.
However, the rate of recovery is only half the rate of decay during the conﬂict. This diﬀerence is robust
to instrumentation and to the inclusion of district dummies. As it happens, this ratio matches the one
found in macroeconomic data on the rate of contraction during civil war and recovery post-conﬂict
estimated by Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004): a country that faced an average seven years long civil war
will need 14 years to reach its counterfactual GDP. In other words, it appears to take approximately
twice the length of the war for both the whole national economy and for employment in a ﬁrm to recover.
14When studying the ﬁrms in 2006, it is important to acknowledge that the sample is de facto only constituted of
ﬁrms that survived the war or were born after it.
15We use the number of employees as a proxy of the size of the ﬁrm.
18Table 3: Size of the ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV




















Intensity 13.569 26.351 1.344 2.980
(3.494)
∗∗∗ (19.522) (7.520) (6.890)


































District eﬀects x x
N 610 610 610 610
R2 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.019
Note: * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%.
Studying the impact of conﬂict on the income of the ﬁrms requires the use of an ordered probit:
employers were asked to answer questions on income using only ranges of income. The income variable
thus varies from 1 to 7, 7 being the highest range.16 We then estimate the following equation:
Pr(Incomei,k = c) = Pr(κc−1 < β1Xi,c + β2Xk,c + β3intensityi,c + µi,k,c ≥ κc (6)
where incomei,k∈ [1;7]. βs are estimated together with the cut points, κ1, κ2,˙ ...,κ6.
We performed a Brant test to verify that proportional odds assumption is not violated, i.e. the
16The ranges proposed are: fewer then a million Le, 1 to 5 million Le, 5 to 10 million Le, 10 to 15 million Le, 20 to
25 million Le, over 25 million Le. The exchange rate between Le and US$ varies around 1/3000.
19Table 4: Ordered logit regressions: income of the ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ologit IV ologit IV










Ln no. of ﬁrms in 1970 -.062 -.069 -.147 -.164
(.114) (.120) (.234) (.211)
Ln no. of ﬁrms in 2006 .276 .227 .380 .443
(.246) (.181) (.442) (.452)














District eﬀects x x
N 406 406 406 406
LL -641.50 -640.09 -641.10 -639.83
Note: * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%.
relationship between each pair of income groups is the same. The result suggests that the assumption
is violated for the number of employees and the population of the chiefdom in 1985, but that the
proportional regression assumption is not violated for the intensity of conﬂict variables. Moreover,
the estimated coeﬃcients are similar when we use an ordered logistic model where the proportional
odds assumption is relaxed for the variables concerned. Therefore, in Table 4 only the ﬁrst set of
regressions are presented. The coeﬃcients of the intensity of conﬂict are always negative suggesting
that the more violent the conﬂict was, the lower the level of income of the ﬁrm ceteris paribus. The
coeﬃcients are only signiﬁcant when the intensity is instrumented. The potential selection bias of the
sample suggests that smaller ﬁrms have been destroyed and that among large ﬁrms only the most
productive would have survived. It is likely that this phenomenon would have been accentuated in
highly intense conﬂict zones. As a result the coeﬃcient of the intensity of conﬂict variable should be
upward biased, consequently the negative eﬀect on the income of ﬁrms might have been even lower if
smaller ﬁrms and unproductive large ﬁrms had survived.
On the one hand, the intensity of conﬂict did not aﬀect either the existence of ﬁrms or their current
(2006) employment level. On the other hand, however, it had a negative eﬀect on both the size and the
income of the ﬁrm. The ﬁndings imply that the conﬂict aﬀected the availability and quality of capital.
Hence, it gives us a ﬁrst sense conﬁrming the theory developed earlier that conﬂict aﬀects ﬁrms by
destroying their human capital. The design of the SLES employers survey enables us to investigate
20this hypothesis more deeply through data on staﬀ training. Speciﬁcally, we investigate whether the
intensity of conﬂict aﬀects the reported willingness of employers to pay for training of their staﬀ.17
The underlying assumption is that the more employers feel a need to train their employees the more
severe their shortage of qualiﬁed labour must be. We therefore estimate the following equation using
a probit model:
Willingness∗
i,k = α + β1Xi + β2Xk + β3intensityi + β4sectork + β5(intensityi ∗ sectork) + εi,k (7)
where willingness is a dummy variable on whether the employer of the ﬁrm k operating in chiefdom
i wants to invest more in the training of his employees. Xi and Xk are vectors of variables relative to
the chiefdom i and to the ﬁrm k. Sectork is a discrete variable equal to one when the ﬁrm k operates
in the sector considered and zero otherwise. Intensityi refers to the intensity of the war in chiefdom i.
The results are reported in Table 5 and 6. We are particularly interested in the sign and signiﬁcance
level of β3 that captures the direct eﬀect of the intensity of war, and β5 the potential sectorial eﬀect
of the conﬂict.
We acknowledge that the willingness to pay for training variable might not be the ideal proxy
for human capital and could in fact capture unobserved characteristics such as wealth eﬀects, credit
constraints or the costs of physical capital. However, we control for whether ﬁnancing is one of the
main constraints for growth and expansion and whether physical assets where acquired in the two
years preceding the interview. Before introducing those as controls in the regression, we investigated
whether there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the ﬁnancing constraint, capital investment, and the
intensity of conﬂict. We observe a positive impact of the intensity of conﬂict on the probability that
the ﬁrm faces major ﬁnancing constraints (Table 9). By contrast there is no signiﬁcant relationship
between the intensity of conﬂict in the zone and the proxy for capital investment. An explanation may
be that physical capital levels might already have caught up in more destroyed areas as the data is
collected ﬁve years after the peace agreement. In the light of those primary ﬁndings we introduced an
interacted term between the intensity of conﬂict and the ﬁnancial constraint dummy.
We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the intensity variable. Although the coeﬃcients are only
signiﬁcant without the inclusion of district eﬀects, they are always positive. Thus, conﬂict appears
to cause a scarcity of skills in those chiefdoms where the war was more intense, as indicated by the
greater need to train. The reported marginal eﬀects are strikingly high. This is consistent with our
theory of ‘forgetting by not doing’: in areas where the conﬂict was more intense, employers show a
signiﬁcant higher need for human capital than in regions less aﬀected by conﬂict, thus controlling for
ﬁnancial constraint and physical capital investment. The coeﬃcient of the latter is positive but never
17Employers were asked whether or not they would be willing to pay for the training of their employees.
21signiﬁcant which tends to conﬁrm that human and physical capital are complementary rather than
substitutes. Indeed, if they were substitutes we would expect ﬁrms who did not invest in physical
capital to signiﬁcantly compensate by training staﬀ and as a result increasing human capital levels.
On the contrary, the results suggest that, if anything, investing in new assets leads to a higher need
for skills. Financial constraints, on the other hand, seem to increase the need for training staﬀ, which
would imply that when employers are constrained to invest, they train their staﬀ. Training may not
been positive. Say a clothing manufacture might need to train its employees to work manually as
it cannot pay for new machines. However, the coeﬃcient of the interacted term is signiﬁcant and
negative, underlying that the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial constraint is lowered by the intensity of conﬂict.
We also investigate the willingness to pay for training of skilled staﬀ as a robustness test. As discussed
earlier, skilled labour elasticity to physical capital is lower than unskilled labour. The results presented
in Table 11 and 12 display the same patterns, conﬁrming the ‘forgetting by not doing’ eﬀect, although
the coeﬃcients of the intensity of conﬂict variable show lower levels of signiﬁcance.
In addition, we observe variations between sectors. Employers in the health and education sectors
are signiﬁcantly more willing to pay for training in conﬂict-aﬀected areas. Possibly this is so, because
these sectors are particularly skill-intensive, requiring workers such as pharmacists, medical staﬀ, or
teachers, whose training most likely occurs in Freetown. The same eﬀect is distinguishable in the
agrobusiness sector, although for diﬀerent reasons. In the construction sector, the willingness to pay
for training of the staﬀ is higher, but we observe the opposite phenomenon in chiefdoms more aﬀected
by the war. Entrepreneurs are less likely to invest in training in those areas. One possible explanation
is that as of 2006 reconstruction mainly occurred in Freetown, which was relatively less destroyed dur-
ing the war than other parts of the country, but was nevertheless the core of post-conﬂict government
attention. In more rural areas in the East, reconstruction had barely started by 2006.
The eﬀect of the selection bias is unknown. If it is likely to bias the coeﬃcient of the size of ﬁrms, it
is only a control variable. However it is not clear how it impacts, if at all, the war intensity coeﬃcients.
6 Conclusion
Using a ﬁrm survey, we investigated the economic legacy of the 1991-2002 war in Sierra Leone. The
theory proposed is that conﬂict results in a signiﬁcant loss in human capital stock as a result of a
‘forgetting by not doing’ phenomenon, broadly analogous to learning by doing. Civil war induces the
reversion to more subsistence activities and less sophisticated techniques so that skills atrophy. During
the post-conﬂict phase the growth of ﬁrms is therefore slower as human capital has become scarce and
22Table 5: Willingness to pay for training (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit IV Probit IV
Agroactivities
Sector -0.186 -4.891 -0.187 -0.197
(0.045)*** (3.565) (0.030)*** (0.015)***
Acquire assets=1 0.061 0.205 0.053 0.053
(0.058) (0.232) (0.060) (0.061)
Financial constraint=1 0.654 2.609 0.676 0.687
(0.180)*** (1.696) (0.206)*** (0.221)***
Intensity 0.749 6.112 0.388 0.450
(0.267)*** (3.197)* (0.563) (0.519)
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -1.101 -5.172 -1.143 -1.181
(0.287)*** (3.781) (0.367)*** (0.450)***
Intensity x sector 1.458 12.933 1.536 2.014
(1.030) (8.022) (0.888)* (0.805)**
Manufacturing
Sector 0.188 1.343 0.144 0.058
(0.361) (0.654)** (0.267) (0.140)
Acquire assets=1 0.070 0.245 0.059 0.058
(0.055) (0.222) (0.056) (0.057)
Financial constraint=1 0.618 2.711 0.644 0.682
(0.196)*** (1.615)* (0.218)*** (0.211)***
Intensity 0.854 6.672 0.438 0.360
(0.313)*** (3.163)** (0.582) (0.362)
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -1.013 -5.402 -1.064 -1.169
(0.292)*** (3.542) (0.361)*** (0.393)***
Intensity x sector -0.097 -1.966 -0.073 0.118
(0.646) (1.420) (0.513) (0.326)
Construction
Sector 0.884 1.097 0.888 0.871
(0.015)*** (0.730) (0.007)*** (0.111)***
Acquire assets=1 0.053 0.190 0.046 0.047
(0.061) (0.240) (0.060) (0.061)
Financial constraint=1 0.644 2.562 0.672 0.665
(0.145)*** (1.512)* (0.175)*** (0.188)***
Intensity 0.994 6.859 0.642 0.336
(0.164)*** (3.023)** (0.450) (0.455)
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -1.067 -5.051 -1.125 -1.113
(0.195)*** (3.425) (0.281)*** (0.348)***
Intensity x sector -4.720 1.663 -4.866 -3.080
(0.194)*** (2.417) (0.400)*** (11.608)
Freetown dummy x x
District eﬀects x x
Obs 379 379 379 379
Notes: * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%. We control for the number of employees and the
income of the ﬁrm, for the log of the number of ﬁrms per chiefdom in 1970 and in 2006 and for the
log of the population per chiefdom in 1985. The instrument is always signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage
regressions. Coeﬃcients are not reported for readability reasons.
23Table 6: Willingness to pay for training (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit IV Probit IV
Sales
Sector -0.111 -0.751 -0.092 -0.068
(0.083) (0.547) (0.048)* (0.107)
Acquire assets=1 0.061 0.216 0.055 0.053
(0.046) (0.191) (0.046) (0.048)
Financial constraint=1 0.597 2.635 0.595 0.611
(0.177)*** (1.623) (0.212)*** (0.234)***
Intensity 0.835 6.196 0.786 3.983
(0.291)*** (0.588) (0.721) (0.669)
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -0.950 -5.212 -0.934 -0.976
(0.243)*** (3.589) (0.321)*** (0.408)**
Intensity x sector -0.146 0.224 -0.169 -0.217
(0.197) (1.461) (0.072)** (0.249)
Health & Education
Sector -0.160 -0.735 -0.168 -0.171
(0.035)*** (1.300) (0.045)*** (0.046)***
Acquire assets=1 0.065 0.217 0.059 0.059
(0.064) (0.250) (0.063) (0.063)
Financial constraint=1 0.596 2.521 0.608 0.592
(0.180)*** (1.487)* (0.214)*** (0.248)**
Intensity 0.676 6.659 0.496 0.545
(0.283)** (2.998)** (0.603) (0.526)
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -0.956 -4.925 -0.971 -0.935
(0.267)*** (3.254) (0.344)*** (0.446)**
Intensity x sector 0.754 2.360 0.799 0.804
(0.131)*** (3.419) (0.187)*** (0.185)***
Services
Sector 0.051 0.908 0.149 0.235
(0.160) (0.575) (0.131) (0.137)*
Acquire assets=1 0.062 0.209 0.053 0.052
(0.063) (0.244) (0.063) (0.063)
Financial constraint=1 0.617 2.781 0.656 0.685
(0.182)*** (1.648)* (0.219)*** (0.236)***
Intensity 0.788 6.953 0.389 0.422
(0.320)** (3.562)* (0.561) (0.477)
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -1.001 -5.559 -1.087 -1.171
(0.288)*** (3.677) (0.396)*** (0.495)**
Intensity x sector -0.079 -2.182 -0.286 -0.455
(0.368) (1.458) (0.263) (0.254)*
Freetown dummy x x
District eﬀects x x
Obs 379 379 379 379
Notes: see notes Table 5.
24takes time to rebuild.
Our results support this hypothesis. Using geographical variations in the intensity of conﬂict, we
ﬁnd that the more ﬁrms were exposed to conﬂict the smaller they were as of 2006. However, such ﬁrms
also tended to recover faster once peace was restored. The rate of recovery was approximately half
the rate of decay during the war, corresponding to the macroeconomic eﬀects of conﬂict and recovery
estimated by Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004).
The analysis of training patterns conﬁrms the lack of skills experienced as a result of war. En-
trepreneurs’ willingness to pay for the training of their staﬀ is signiﬁcantly higher in those areas of the
country most aﬀected by the conﬂict, indicating a more acute shortage of skilled labour.
As a result of this observation, post-conﬂict governments should prioritize training in sectors that
produce non-tradable goods, especially the capital non-tradable goods.
The ‘forgetting by not doing’ phenomenon has important implications for the recovery of a country.
Indeed, ﬁrms have to make do with lower quality workers. This impacts negatively their productivity
and the acquisition of new techniques of production. As a result, the growth process is likely to be
slowed down. In fact, post-conﬂict environments experience a ‘supra-normal growth’, underlying a
catching up of the economy, potentially driven by the physical reconstruction. The rate of catching up
is, however, diminished by the destruction of human capital, which takes long to recover, if ever, its
counterfactual. Firms are also less competitive and exports will suﬀer accordingly. If the lack of skills
in post-conﬂict economies is tackled early, it is likely that recovery would be much faster.
The lack of skills can also have much longer term consequences. Indeed, civil war not only deskills
the existing labour force, but conﬂict also implies huge disturbances in schooling. The education sys-
tem collapses often completely and children miss important years of schooling. As mentioned earlier,
in Sierra Leone children were forcibly enrolled in the guerilla, some as young as age seven. Once peace
is settled, there is a clear necessity to reconstruct the education system but no competences in the
economy to achieve it. If not addressed, generations will continue to be lost. Formation and training
appear as a necessity, but they are too few competent teachers or trainers. A solution is to encourage
the diaspora to return and pass on the knowledge they acquired abroad during wartime.
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Figure 6: Map of Sierra Leone
Source: UNDP and DACO/SLIS.
29Table 7: Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Conﬂict intensity 846 0.396312 0.0688547 0.1708333 0.7894737
Freetown 847 0.6174734 0.4862913 0 1
Age of the ﬁrm 678 9.079646 10.70704 0 86
Years of operation during conﬂict 830 2.191566 3.696988 0 10
No. of employees 691 13.17945 59.14889 0 1350
Income of the ﬁrm 406 9315271 9939713 500000 2.75e+07
Willingness to invest in training 678 0.2020649 0.4018368 0 1
Financial constraints 689 0.394775 0.4891574 0 1
Acquire assets 675 0.3081481 0.4620705 0 1
Table 8: Firms by sectors of activities
Freq. Percent Cum. percent
Agro activities 27 4.04 4.04
Construction 20 2.99 7.03
Health and education 63 9.42 16.44
Manufacturing 63 9.42 25.86
Sales 321 47.98 73.84
Services 175 26.16 100.00
Total 669 100.00
Table 9: Financial constraint
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit IV Probit IV
Intensity 1.061 1.992 1.362 1.210
(0.289)∗∗∗ (0.217)∗∗∗ (0.966) (0.320)∗∗∗
No. of employees 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001)∗ (0.001) (0.000)∗ (0.001)∗
Firm revenue -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln no. of ﬁrms in 1970 0.036 0.048 0.097 0.083
(0.033) (0.035) (0.035)∗∗∗ (0.033)∗∗
Ln no. of ﬁrms in 2006 -0.056 -0.048 -0.126 -0.115
(0.032)∗ (0.036) (0.025)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗
Ln population in 1985 0.203 0.234 0.185 0.187









District eﬀects x x
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.063 0.068 0.065
Observations 398 398 398 398
Note: * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%.
30Table 10: Physical investment: were new assets acquired during the past two years?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit IV Probit IV
Intensity 0.297 0.369 -0.917 0.294
(0.100)∗∗∗ (0.333) (0.712) (0.771)
Financial constraint=1 -0.023 -0.024 -0.022 -0.029
(0.040) (0.038) (0.037) (0.041)
No. of employees 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗
Firm revenue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Ln no. of ﬁrms in 1970 -0.053 -0.052 -0.082 -0.074
(0.023)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗ (0.041)∗∗ (0.019)∗∗∗
Ln no. of ﬁrms in 2006 -0.022 -0.021 0.016 -0.001
(0.013)∗ (0.015) (0.064) (0.030)
Ln population in 1985 0.206 0.207 0.220 0.234









District eﬀects x x
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.096 0.10 0.100
Observations 398 398 398 398
Note: * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%.
31Table 11: Willingness to pay for training of skilled workers (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit IV Probit IV
Agroactivities
Sector -0.121 -5.802 -0.112 -0.119
(0.025)*** (3.452)* (0.020)*** (0.009)***
Acquire assets=1 0.064 0.291 0.060 0.066
(0.041) (0.225) (0.045) (0.044)
Financial constraint=1 0.334 0.923 0.376 0.456
(0.059)*** (1.683) (0.090)*** (0.081)***
Intensity 0.339 4.212 -0.147 0.557
(0.148)** (2.843) (0.339) (0.670
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -0.503 -1.599 -0.567 -0.710
(0.143)*** (4.268) (0.175)*** (0.152)***
Intensity x sector 1.190 15.468 1.184 1.574
(0.824) (7.774)** (0.651)* (0.544)***
Manufacturing
Sector 0.127 0.999 0.081 0.032
(0.185) (1.137) (0.123) (0.111)
Acquire assets=1 0.072 0.339 0.064 0.070
(0.041)* (0.222) (0.045) (0.044)
Financial constraint=1 0.279 1.200 0.328 0.439
(0.054)*** (1.491) (0.087)*** (0.073)***
Intensity 0.447 5.100 -0.124 0.437
(0.180)** (3.083)* (0.336) (0.665)
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -0.414 -2.265 -0.493 -0.686
(0.127)*** (3.748) (0.168)*** (0.133)***
Intensity x sector 0.015 -0.884 0.051 0.166
(0.291) (2.416) (0.247) (0.197)
Construction
Sector 0.941 -2.200 0.944 0.960
(0.009)*** (1.202)* (0.007)*** (0.083)***
Acquire assets=1 0.052 0.247 0.048 0.052
(0.043) (0.227) (0.045) (0.040)
Financial constraint=1 0.341 0.856 0.382 0.405
(0.042)*** (1.597) (0.054)*** (0.062)***
Intensity 0.607 5.210 0.071 0.398
(0.144)*** (2.821)* (0.582) (0.665)
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -0.498 -1.375 -0.560 -0.606
(0.049)*** (4.051) (0.085)*** (0.108)***
Intensity x sector -4.566 9.558 -4.065 -6.436
(0.053)*** (2.243)*** (0.343)*** (14.946)
Freetown dummy x x
District eﬀects x x
Obs 379 379 379 379
Notes: * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%. We control for the number of employees and the
income of the ﬁrm, for the log of the number of ﬁrms per chiefdom in 1970 and in 2006 and for the
log of the population per chiefdom in 1985. The instrument is always signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage
regressions. Coeﬃcients are not reported for readability reasons.
32Table 12: Willingness to pay for training of skilled workers (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit IV Probit IV
Sales
Sector 0.114 0.620 0.111 0.184
(0.125) (1.285) (0.104) (0.101)*
Acquire assets=1 0.063 0.315 0.062 0.067
(0.033)* (0.178)* (0.036)* (0.036)*
Financial constraint=1 0.235 0.788 0.224 0.253
(0.036)*** (1.580) (0.054)*** (0.071)***
Intensity 0.631 6.150 0.648 1.486
(0.249)** (4.172) (0.122)*** (0.558)***
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -0.313 -1.182 -0.302 -0.353
(0.084)*** (4.051) (0.121)** (0.143)**
Intensity x sector -0.615 -3.293 -0.593 -0.808
(0.237)*** (2.609) (0.181)*** (0.229)***
Health & Education
Sector -0.148 -2.465 -0.139 -0.146
(0.009)*** (2.062) (0.012)*** (0.008)***
Acquire assets=1 0.070 0.327 0.067 0.075
(0.048) (0.249) (0.048) (0.048)
Financial constraint=1 0.250 0.718 0.278 0.292
(0.044)*** (1.482) (0.080)*** (0.092)***
Intensity 0.226 3.842 0.028 0.758
(0.170) (2.918) (0.204) (0.523)
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -0.339 -0.985 -0.390 -0.415
(0.107)*** (3.737) (0.157)** (0.170)**
Intensity x sector 1.127 6.284 1.048 1.248
(0.188)*** (4.720) (0.225)*** (0.154)***
Services
Sector -0.098 0.185 -0.028 0.009
(0.065) (0.550) (0.089) (0.115)
Acquire assets=1 0.065 0.291 0.058 0.064
(0.047) (0.242) (0.049) (0.049)
Financial constraint=1 0.251 1.049 0.311 0.397
(0.050)*** (1.515) (0.096)*** (0.113)***
Intensity 0.291 4.873 -0.173 0.450
(0.162)* (2.992) (0.344) (0.687)
Intensity x ﬁn. constraint -0.342 -1.849 -0.448 -0.604
(0.125)*** (3.857) (0.195)** (0.209)***
Intensity x sector 0.327 -0.428 0.094 -0.005
(0.254) (1.242) (0.247) (0.270)
Freetown dummy x x
District eﬀects x x
Obs 379 379 379 379
Notes: see notes in Table 11.
33